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Genetic reassortmentIn November 2019, The World Health Organization (WHO) issued a draft set of Target Product Profiles
(TPPs) describing optimal and minimally acceptable targets for vaccines against Rift Valley fever (RVF),
a Phlebovirus with a three segmented genome, in both humans and ruminants. The TPPs contained rigid
requirements to protect against genomic reassortment of live, attenuated vaccines (LAVs) with wild-type
RVF virus (RVFV), which place undue constraints on development and regulatory approval of LAVs. We
review the current LAVs in use and in development, and conclude that there is no evidence that reassort-
ment between LAVs and wild-type RVFV has occurred during field use, that such a reassortment event if
it occurred would have no untoward consequence, and that the TPPs should be revised to provide a more
balanced assessment of the benefits versus the theoretical risks of reassortment.
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On 5 November 2019, WHO issued a draft set of Target Product
Profiles (TPPs) describing optimal and minimally acceptable tar-
gets for vaccines against Rift Valley fever (RVF) in both humans
and ruminants (https://www.who.int/news-room/articles-detail/
rift-valley-fever-vaccines-target-product-profile). RVF is on WHO’s
Blueprint list of priority diseases with epidemic potential for which
there are no or insufficient, countermeasures available. As will be
described below, currently there are approved and investigational
RVF live, attenuated vaccines (LAVs) for veterinary use. Only one
investigational RVF LAV has so far been tested in humans, but
promising new LAVs are in preclinical development.
Two sets of TPPs, one for human and one for veterinary vacci-
nes, were provided by WHO for public comment. Both the human
and veterinary TPPs have many features in common, and both con-
tain rigid requirements to protect against genomic reassortment of
LAVs with wild-type RVF virus (RVFV). We believe the draft TPPs
place undue constraints on development and regulatory approval
of LAVs and need to be revised to provide a more balanced assess-
ment of the benefit:risk equation.
The WHO draft TPPs contain the following statements in the
Safety sections of the document:
Veterinary vaccines. ‘‘Live attenuated virus vaccines are not to
be used for vaccination of potentially viraemic animals during an
outbreak of RVFV, given their potential to reassort with wild type
virus” (applies to both optimal and minimally acceptable profiles).
Human vaccines. ‘‘No live attenuated virus vaccine to be used
unless reassorting is excluded (optimal)”, or ‘‘Usage of an attenu-
ated live vaccine that may allow reassortment is not indicated in
an outbreak setting” (minimal acceptable profile).
In support of these criteria, the WHO Background section states
that reassortment of the segmented genome of RVF LAVs is possi-
ble on theoretical grounds. As evidence of a safety concern, a single
example is cited: ‘‘Specifically, reassortment in a man who was co-
infected with a wild-type strain and a live-attenuated vaccine
strain has been reported [1].” An alternative source indicates the
patient was female and had a significant illness from which she
fully recovered (R. Swanepoel, pers. comm., 2019). However, the
sequence of the isolate (SA184/10) from the patient has been re-
evaluated by full genomic sequencing and found not to be a reas-
sortant [2]; the patient likely had a wild-type RVFV infection.
The benefits of a LAV for prevention and control of RVF out-
breaks clearly outweigh the theoretical risk of reassortment, which
has not been demonstrated to be a safety problem despite market-
ing of two RVFV LAVs and several others in development. Safety of
new vaccines must be determined in suitably powered trials for
licensure and thereafter by post-marketing surveillance. Theoreti-
cal safety risks, such as that posed by reassortment, can be
addressed through vaccine design and experimental studies. How-
ever, since the possibility of recombination is a basic attribute ofany replicating vaccine virus, and reassortment is a basic attribute
of replicating vaccine viruses with segmented genomes, theoretical
risks should not be a priori restrictions on use of vaccines other-
wise shown to be safe and effective.
The following commentary first deals with the LAV question,
and then specifically with the RVF vaccines intended for veterinary
and human use.2. Live, attenuated Rift Valley fever vaccines in use and in
development
Table 1 provides a summary of the RVF LAVs that are in use or in
development. These are described in more detail below.2.1. Smithburn Neurotropic vaccine
The first and oldest LAV is the Smithburn Neurotropic Strain
(SNS) that has been used for over 50 years in parts of Africa. While
the SNS vaccine is still in use in countries where RVF outbreaks
have occurred in the past, concerns remain about safety and effi-
cacy, consistency of manufacture, vaccine stability, inadequate
timeliness and coverage of vaccination before and during epi-
zootics. This experience, which is informed by the history of atten-
uating passages and inability to adequately control the balance of
attenuation and virulence, supports development and introduction
of improved vaccines and improved policies for their use.
SNS has been used exclusively for immunization of ruminants
and has not been tested in humans because it is abortigenic in
ruminants and retains neurovirulence for nonhuman primates.
The SNS vaccine originated by serial passage of a RVFV strain iso-
lated from mosquitoes in Uganda in 1944 in mouse brains [3]. It
underwent additional serial passages in mouse brain and in
embryonated duck eggs by yolk sac inoculation, with initial com-
mercial lots of ‘avianized’ vaccine produced in the early 1950s
[4]. Subsequently, virus at mouse brain passage level 102 followed
by 54 passes in duck embryos and a further 16 passages in mouse
brains was used to prepare commercial vaccine (10% freeze-dried
mouse brain suspension) until 1958 when new lots were prepared
in mouse brain tissue directly frommouse passage 102 virus (with-
out duck embryo passage). Since 1971, vaccine has been produced
in continuous BHK-21 baby hamster kidney cells infected with
mouse brain passage 102 and marketed by Onderstepoort Biologi-
cal Products (OBP). It is recommended for use in healthy adult ani-
mals only and is not safe for pregnant animals. An inactivated
vaccine, based on an adjuvanted, formalin-inactivated virulent
strain of RVFV, is also marketed by OBP. This vaccine may be
applied to animals during all physiological stages, including preg-
nancy, but repeated vaccinations are required for optimal efficacy.
Although both these classical vaccines have proven valuable in
controlling RVF in endemic/enzootic areas, a vaccine that combines
Table 1
Live, attenuated replication competent RVFV vaccines in use or in development.
Vaccine Derivation/Basis for
attenuation
Marketing/Usage Target
indication
Adverse effects and
other potential
concerns
Evaluated
for human
use
Characteristics
reducing risk of
reassortment
Smithburn Neurotropic Strain (SNS) Derived by empirical passage/ Not
defined
Onderstepoort
Biological Products
(OBP) and
(intermittently) other
manufacturers (Egypt,
Kenya)/50 years use in
parts of Africa
Adult, (non-
pregnant)
ruminants
1. Low rates of abor-
tions in sheep
2. inconsistent avail-
ability, vaccine
quality and
stability
No
Clone-13 Derived by empirical
passage/ Internal deletion of
569 nucleotides in NSs
OBP/Africa since 2010 Ruminants 1. Single report of
fetal malforma-
tions and stillbirths
(experimental
study only)
2. Experimental
infection of
mosquitoes
No No detectable viremia
(ruminants) below
threshold for mosquito
infection
MP-12 Derived by passage with
chemical mutagenesis/
Multiple attenuating
mutations in all 3 segments.
Zoetis/Conditionally licensed for use
in U.S.
Ruminants,
humans
1. Single report of
abortion in sheep
(experimental
study)
2. Experimental
transmission to
mosquitoes
Phase I-II
trials with
promising
results
Low viremia in
ruminants and
humans, below
threshold for mosquito
infection
MP-12-
NSm-del
Derived by reverse genetics/
Deletion of NSm plus MP-12
attenuating mutations.
M.C.I Santé Animale/in development Ruminants None reported No No detectable viremia
in ruminants. Not
infectious for
mosquitoes.
DNSs-
DNSm
rRVFV
(DDVaxTM) Derived by reverse genetics. Deletion
of NSs and NSm
In development Humans,
ruminants
None reported
In development No detectable viremia in ruminants.
Not infectious for mosquitoes.
RVFV-4s Derived by reverse genetics/
Split M segment, 4
segments, NSs deletion.
In development Humans,
Ruminants
None reported In
development
No detectable viremia
in ruminants.
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vaccine would be extremely valuable.
Because of the safety issues surrounding the SNS LAV in rumi-
nants, newer candidates have been developed, as described below.
The goal of new vaccines has been to improve the safety profile,
while retaining the advantages of LAVs (single dose, rapid onset
of protection, and durability of immunity).
In considering these vaccines, it is important to separate the
safety concerns related to abortion, congenital infection, and trans-
missibility (mosquito infection) from those related to genetic reas-
sortment. Vaccines should be demonstrably safe and effective with
no documented adverse events consistent with the severity of nat-
ural disease.
Clone-13. Live and inactivated SNS vaccines remained the only
registered veterinary countermeasures available in some African
countries for decades until the introduction of Clone 13 in 2010
by OBP. This attenuated strain, originally described by Muller
et al. contains a spontaneous large internal deletion of 549 nucleo-
tides that removes 69% of the open reading frame of NSs that
occurred during serial passage of a virulent isolate of RVFV [5].
NSs is a non-structural protein of RVFV and has been determined
to be the major virulence determinant counteracting host innate
immune responses [6,7]. Clone 13 does not induce detectable vir-
emia and has been tested in cattle, sheep and goats in large open
field trials in Kenya and the data indicated that it was safe [8]. A
large open field study in pregnant sheep and goats was also per-
formed in Senegal, and no evidence of the vaccine causing abor-
tions was found [9]. However, a subsequent experimental study
showed that Clone 13 was associated with fetal malformationsand less frequently, stillbirths [10]. The virus is capable of infecting
mosquitoes experimentally, but transmission efficiency is low [11].
Since Clone 13 does not induce detectable viremia in the target
species for vaccination, the chance of transmission from vaccinated
animals to mosquitoes is considered negligible. Clone-13 has not
been evaluated for human vaccination.
MP-12.MP-12 is another LAV vaccine for the prevention of RVF
that was first developed by the US ArmyMedical Research Institute
of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) for human use by a process of
chemical mutagenesis. The vaccine is under development by the
Sabin Vaccine Institute, Washington DC. MP-12 vaccine is condi-
tionally licensed by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) for
veterinary use in the U.S. MP-12 is attenuated based on multiple
(23) single nucleotide permutations (SNP) on all three RNA seg-
ments, L, M and S. For this reason, the potential for reversion to vir-
ulence by reassortment with wild-type RVFV is minimized or
precluded since acquisition of one or more wild-type segments
by the vaccine virus would be attenuated by mutations in the
remaining gene(s). There is no evidence at all that a ‘‘novel” strain
with increased virulence or tropism would emerge from such an
event. MP-12 has been clinically tested in over 90 human volun-
teers and found to rapidly elicit neutralizing antibody titers that
lasted over 5 years with minimal or absent viremia, genetic stabil-
ity in vivo, and no significant adverse effects [12,13]. The vaccine is
similarly effective in protecting laboratory animals (including non-
human primates), and livestock against virulent RVFV challenge
[14]. Morrill demonstrated that pregnant sheep vaccinated with
MP-12 were protected against challenge using virulent RVF virus,
and that blood from newborn lambs was free of RVFV neutralizing
4 T.P. Monath et al. / Vaccine: X 5 (2020) 100060antibody, indicating that transplacental infection had not occurred.
However lambs born to vaccinated ewes gained protective anti-
body after the first nursing from maternal colostrum [15]. There
is a single, unsubstantiated report of abortion in sheep associated
with MP-12 [16], but multiple other studies showed no safety sig-
nals in pregnant sheep or cows [15,17,18,19]. MP-12 can infect
mosquitoes experimentally, but transmission is considered to be
excluded based on the absent or minimal viremia observed in
ruminants and humans [20].
MP-12-NSm-del. Won et al. used reverse genetics to modify
MP-12 by deleting a region of the open reading frame encoding
the non-structural protein, NSm and observed that the resulting
virus replicated in vitro equally well as the parental MP-12 [21].
Deletion of the NSm virulence factor is combined with attenuating
mutations on all three segments of MP-12, and would retain an
attenuated phenotype even if reassortment with wild-type virus
reconstituted the NSm gene. Morrill et al. showed that vaccination
of sheep and calves with MP-12-NSm-del resulted in RVFV neutral-
izing antibodies levels comparable to MP-12 [22,23]. The vaccine
was then tested in goats, sheep and calves in Tanzania and Mor-
occo and found to induce antibodies that neutralized MP-12 and
presumably virulent RVFV as well. The level of response was
slightly lower than tests using animals from North America, but
still reached what is believed to be protective titers [24,25]. The
deletion of NSm precludes infection of mosquito vectors. The vac-
cine is in advanced development for veterinary indications by M.C.I
Santé Animale, Mohammedia, Morocco.
2.2. Recombinant live, attenuated RVF vaccines containing complete
deletion of NSs or both NSs and NSm
Bird et al. used reverse genetics to develop a recombinant RVFV,
containing the deletion of the NSs gene alone (DNSs rRVFV) or the
NSs/NSm genes in combination, DNSs-DNSm rRVFV (DDVaxTM),
which contains complete gene deletions of the two known viru-
lence factors, the NSs and NSm genes [26,27]. NSs and NSm are
not required in cell culture for efficient virus replication, assembly,
or maturation. Both candidates were highly attenuated, immuno-
genic, and efficacious in a rat model and in sheep with no detect-
able post-vaccination viremia. The vaccine was not teratogenic in
pregnant sheep. Both vaccines were immunogenic and protective
in non-human primates [28]. The attenuating deletions in two
RNA segments reduces the likelihood of reversion to virulence by
reassortment with wild-type virus. The NSm deletion alone ren-
ders the vaccine incapable of infecting mosquitoes in experimental
studies [29]. The vaccine was originally constructed by the Centers
for Disease Control and is now being developed by Colorado State
University and the University of California, Davis with the goal of
human testing.
2.3. Four segmented RVFV (RVFV-4s)
The most recently developed live-attenuated RVF vaccine was
created by splitting the M genome segment into two M-type seg-
ments [30]. The resulting vaccine virus depends on the co-
packaging of 4, instead of the naturally occurring 3 genome seg-
ments and lacks the NSs gene. The split M genome segment and
the NSs deletion were shown to independently render the virus
non-virulent. The resulting vaccine was shown to be safe for mice,
young lambs, pregnant sheep, goats, cattle and marmosets and to
provide sterilizing immunity after a single vaccination of mice,
sheep, goats and cattle. (manuscript in preparation and [31,32]).
Complete absence of viremia in all evaluated species, even after
application of an overdose, underscores that risks of genetic reas-sortment or transmission of the vaccine via mosquitoes are negli-
gible. The vaccine is being developed by Central Veterinary
Institute, Wageningen Bioveterinary Research, The Netherlands,
with the goal of human testing.3. Theoretical reassortment risk assessment
3.1. What is the evidence for reassortment of vaccine viruses, in
general?
In 2003 and 2013, theWHO convened informal consultations on
characterization and quality aspects of vaccines based on live virus
vectors; representatives from all major regulatory authorities par-
ticipated. One concern that emerged was that recombination of a
live virus-vectored vaccine with a circulating or reactivated latent
virus could theoretically generate a more pathogenic strain.
To follow up on this report, the Brighton Collaboration (a global,
non-profit, scientifically independent, group created for the pur-
pose of providing reliable, high quality international information
and guidelines relevant to vaccine safety) charged a working group
to explore the relevance of recombination to vaccine safety. The
working group findings in 2016 [33] considered examples of, and
risks attributed to recombination and reassortment of traditional
LAVs and novel, chimeric vectored vaccines. All extant examples
of such interactions were cited.
One important conclusion of this search for examples of recom-
bination is that they have rarely occurred, and have had limited
consequences, considering the long history of use of LAVs (Table 2).
Interestingly, genomic recombination of LAVs and wild-type
viruses has actually occurred more frequently with single-
stranded RNA viruses than with viruses having segmented gen-
omes. LAVs against segmented viruses have been developed or
commercialized for veterinary use (RVFV, bluetongue [34], African
horsesickness [35], canine influenza [36], and for human use [in-
fluenza [37] (US and Russian commercial vaccines)]. Unlike RVFV
which consists of a single virus, some LAVs, such as African hors-
esickness and bluetongue are formulated with multiple distinct
serotype viruses; reassortment between vaccine strains has been
associated with either reversion to virulence or no phenotypic
change [38–41]. It is relevant to note that FDA labeling of live influ-
enza vaccine (FluMist), containing four genetically engineered
influenza strains, does not contain precautions for reassortment.
The Brighton Collaboration report cites the following variables
that should be considered in assessing risk of recombination.
1. Intrinsic recombination properties of the parent virus
2. Sequence relatedness of vector and wild virus
3. Host range, pathogenesis and transmission
4. Replication competency in target host
5. Mechanism of attenuation
6. Additional factors potentially affecting virulence
These factors will be considered below in the case of RVFV
vaccines.3.2. What is the evidence for reassortment of RVFV, specifically?
The evidence from phylogenetic studies of RVFV strains indi-
cates that reassortment between RVFV strains (but not other
viruses) has played a role in the evolution of the virus, but that
low levels of diversity have been observed over 67 years [42]. Reas-
sortment events, while reported in nature, have been rare com-
pared to sequence variations resulting from mutations [43].
Table 2
Examples of recombination or reassortment of live attenuated vaccines and wild-type viruses.
Live, attenuated
vaccine
Target
species
Genome type Vaccine and
Recombination event
Estimated
frequency
Recombination
mechanism
Phenotypic
change
Clinical
relevance
Epidemiological
relevance
Segmented genome viruses
African
horsesickness
Horses Reoviridae,
orbivirus, 9
serotypes,
double-strand
RNA, 10
segments
Reassortants with
individual genome
segments derived from
multiple different virus
types present in the
trivalent vaccine
3 reported
outbreaks
caused by
distinct
reassortant
viruses
Reassortment Increased
virulence
Hemorrhagic
disease,
possibly lower
case-fatality
Three outbreaks
in Cape
Province, South
Africa
Bluetongue Sheep,
cattle
Reoviridae,
orbivirus, 26+
serotypes,
double-strand
RNA, 10
segments
Three pentavalent
vaccines in three
sequential inocula: (1)
serotypes 1, 4, 6, 12, and
14; (2) serotypes 3, 8, 9,
10, and 11; and (3)
serotypes 2, 5, 7, 13, and
19. Reversion or
reassortment of LAV
vaccine strains and
between LAV and wild-
type virus
Several
reports
Reassortment of
LAV vaccine
strains and
between LAV
and wild-type
virus
Not reported No clear cut
evidence of
increased
virulence of
reassortant
strains
reported
None recognized
Non-segmented genome viruses
Newcastle
disease virus
(NDV)
Chickens Paramyxovirus
negative sense
nonsegmented
single-strand
(ss) RNA
Recombination with wild-
type NDV
Probably
common
Both intra- and
intergenic
recombination
events between
LAVs and wild-
type viruses
Unknown Unknown Vaccine
sequences
circulate in
recombinant
strains play a
role in evolution
Oral polio
vaccine (OPV)
Humans Picornavirus
positive sense
non-segmented
ssRNA
Recombination with wild-
type poliovirus
Relatively
common
Homologous
intertypic
recombination
with wild-type
polio, Coxsackie,
and other
enteroviruses
Increased
virulence for
transgenic
mice
Vaccine
associated
paralytic
disease in
human
Over 30
described
epidemics of
vaccine-
associated
paralytic polio
caused by
circulating
recombinant
strains
Bovine viral
diarrhea
Cows Pestivirus
positive sense
non-segmented
ssRNA
Recombination of LAV
with persistently infecting
non-cytopathic viruses
5 cases, but
may be
frequent
homologous and
nonhomologous
recombination
Increased
cytopathology
in cell culture
Converts non-
cytopathic
persistently
infecting virus
to virulent
strain causing
mucosal
disease
Sporadic
mucosal disease
Infectious laryngotracheitis virus Chickens Herpesvirus
double stranded
linear DNA
Recombination
of LAV and wild-
type
Common Homologous
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heterologous phleboviruses, or more distantly related bun-
yaviruses. It may be inferred that similar limitations would reduce
the potential for successful reassortment of an LAV with heterolo-
gous viruses, creating a chimera with unknown pathogenicity.
Experimental studies have recently borne out this fact; a recent
study evaluated the potential of MP-12 LAV to reassort with other
related viruses of the family Phenuiviridae including Arumowot
virus, a phlebovirus and no viable reassortant viruses were pro-
duced [44].3.3. What is the evidence for and risk of reassortment of live,
attenuated RVF vaccines?
With respect to the points #1 and 2 cited by Condit et al. [33], it
is acknowledged that RVFV LAVs have segmented genomes, and
that such vaccines have sequence homologies with wild-type RVFV
strains, both of which present theoretical risks of reassortment.
Notwithstanding this potential, the evidence for reassortment
of LAVs and wild-type strains is extremely limited. As cited above
[1], the WHO document background section cites, as evidence of a
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about reassortment, and doubt remains whether the patient’s ill-
ness was due to an LAV-wild-type reassortant or wild-type virus.
In addition, the isolate from the patient (SA/184/10) was re-
evaluated by full genomic sequencing and found not to be a reas-
sortant [2].
Unlike orbiviruses such as bluetongue and African horsesick-
ness LAVs that have more complex 10-segmented genomes and
multiple serotypes, requiring that vaccines consist of mixtures of
multiple co-infecting viruses that can reassort in vivo, RVF LAV
consists of a single virus that cannot reassort unless simultaneous
coinfection occurs with an exogenous virus.
Gaudrealt et al. [45]. provide a comprehensive review of reas-
sortment of RVFV, citing examples from experimental and field
studies with LAVs. The review supports the conclusion that, while
reassortant wild-type viruses have been identified, this was an
uncommon phenomenon. The evidence provided for reassortment
between wild-type and attenuated LAVs in natural infection was
limited to the SA184/10 strain from the patient with a needle stick
injury cited earlier, for which full genomic sequencing indicates
that it is not a reassortant virus [2]. Where reassortment has been
demonstrated in experimental studies (by coinfection in vitro or in
mosquitoes) no evidence for strains of increased pathogenicity has
been found.
The risk of reassortment of the SNS vaccine with wild-type virus
was also reviewed by Grobelaar et al. [1]. The authors point to the
methods used in vaccinating livestock, where automatic syringes
are used with intermittent needle changes, affording a means of
iatrogenic virus transfer that would enhance the chances of coin-
fection with vaccine (SNS) and wild-type RVFV. Despite this,
sequencing studies of multiple strains from ruminants during out-
breaks where the vaccine was widely used has not revealed clear
evidence for reassortment [1,45].
In the setting of an RVF epizootic (and potential spill-over to
humans), risks associated with LAV have been deemed acceptable.
Such risks would be even more acceptable in the case of LAVs with
lower pathogenicity (for both livestock and humans) than the SNS
and with molecular constraints limiting viremia and vector infec-
tion. We see no empirical evidence to support rigid constraintsFig. 1. Genetic reassortment of live attenuated vaccine candidates with wild-type
RVFV is unlikely to result in a more virulent or transmissible phenotype. 1. Wild-
type virus that obtains an LAV segment(s) would be partially attenuated or retain
the original phenotype. 2. LAVs that obtain a wild-type segment(s) would not
exceed the original virulence profile of the circulating wild-type parental strain.related to reassortment as posited in the WHO TPP. It is notewor-
thy that the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations
(CEPI) is currently funding the manufacturing and Phase I/II clinical
evaluation of two LAV (DDVaxTM and the RVFV-4 s vaccine).
With respect to points #3–6 cited by Condit et al. [33], reassort-
ments between LAVs and wild-type virus would be unlikely to pro-
duce novel viruses with pathogenicity, host range, or transmission
potential greater than the wild-type virus responsible for co-
infection. LAVs in development (described above) all have docu-
mented mechanisms of attenuation, and some have redundant
deletions, polygenic mutations, or genetic rearrangements that
by design mitigate risks accompanying theoretical reassortment
events.
Each vaccine candidate has a specific set of risks based on its
mechanism of attenuation (Condit et al. [33] point #5). For MP-
12 and MP-12-NSm-del, which have attenuating mutations on all
three genome segments, attenuation would remain after substitu-
tion of a wild-type genome segment; conversely acquisition of an
MP-12 or MP-12-NSm-del genome segment by wild-type virus
would be attenuating, as shown experimentally [46]. For Clone
13 reassortment with the S segment from a wild-type strain would
reconstitute virulence but the single animal in which coinfection
occurred would have an outcome no worse than the original
wild-type infection. Theoretically the reassorted (now fully wild-
type) virus could be transmitted but would have no relevance in
an area where wild-type strains were already circulating. Similarly,
the DD-Vax and RVFV-4s vaccines have polygenic deletions or gen-
ome rearrangements that should reduce any hypothetical risk of
reversion to virulence through reassortment with a wild-type
virus.
Aside from iatrogenic needle-syringe transmission between
ruminants noted above, the settings in which reassortment are
limited to: (1) co-infection with a wild-type strain in the vector
mosquito, which could acquire blood meals by interrupted feeding
on ruminants infected with vaccine and wild-type viruses, or could
have been infected with wild-type virus in a previous gonotrophic
cycle; (2) co-infection in a vaccinated ruminant or human by a
mosquito infected with wild-type virus or by direct contact with
infected ruminant blood or tissues; or (3) vaccination of a rumi-
nant or human during acute infection with wild-type virus. If, in
these circumstances, reassortment occurred it would be of no con-
sequence (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1 depicts the range of phenotypic outcomes of reassortment
between a LAV and wild-type virus. If an LAV genome segment was
acquired by a wild-type virus, the phenotype of the resulting virus
would be attenuated or unchanged. If a wild-type virus genome
segment was acquired by an LAV, its host range, viremia level,
pathogenicity, and transmissibility (shedding, arthropod infection)
could be increased, but is unlikely to exceed that of the wild-type
virus itself. Experimental observations of reassortment between
the MP-12 LAV and wild-type RVFV have illustrated these conclu-
sions [30]. Since it is impossible to exclude all biological possibili-
ties through empirical, experimental studies of this sort, a risk-
based approach to application of LAVs is required.
From a practical perspective, it would be advisable to limit
opportunities for reassortment by changing practices that promote
iatrogenic spread of viruses and coinfections (LAVs, wild-type
virus, and reassorted viruses). For veterinary vaccines, needles
should be changed between animals or alternate devices used to
deliver vaccines. For human immunization, it is general practice
to exclude patients who are acutely ill until they are recovered,
and this would apply to new vaccines, including LAVs and defec-
tive vector vaccines. These factors could be considered in the
WHO TPP, without stipulations that exclude use of vaccines during
epizootics or epidemics.
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The WHO is encouraged to provide a more balanced view of
reassortment, emphasizing that reassortment between RVFV LAVs
and wild-type strains have been rarely documented compared to
other vaccines, with no indication that reassortant events would
result in novel strains with enhanced pathogenicity or transmis-
sion potential. Despite use of RVF LAVs in multiple epizootics,
clear-cut evidence for reassortment has not been observed by
genomic analysis of multiple strains. Moreover, reassortment
between an LAV and a wild-type virus is unlikely to result in a
virus with virulence characteristics higher than the wild-type virus
causing the coinfection.
LAV developers should consider reassortment in experimental
studies of vaccine candidates and to provide a risk-based analysis
of vaccine safety. WHO should consider adding language encourag-
ing vaccine developers to consider reassortment in a vaccine-
specific risk-based analysis, considering the factors listed in the
Brighton Collaboration document [33] and the risks and benefits
of vaccine use in both epizootic/epidemic and endemic settings.4.1. TPP for veterinary use
Safety/Reactogenicity: We disagree that the target profile for
veterinary vaccines should be less restrictive with respect to reas-
sortment than for human vaccines. The risk of co-infection and
reassortment in ruminants (the viremic host species that amplify
circulation of RVFV) is certainly greater than in humans due to
their higher exposure to mosquito vectors, high viremia, inappar-
ent infection in adults favoring vaccination of infected animals,
and the cross-contaminating needle practices..
We also disagree with the restriction against use of LAVs during
an outbreak since the benefit of vaccination outweighs the (theo-
retical) low risks and consequences of reassortment, while the risk
of expanding disease is high. However, it is important to increase
awareness of farmers to prevent transmission of wild-type RVFV
via repeated needle use. A benefit:risk ratio (e.g. RVF abortions pre-
vented per excess LAV related abortion) could be estimated based
on modeling.
We agree with the TPP that the vaccine not be abortigenic or
teratogenic. However, vertical transmission to the fetus may be
acceptable provided it is not abortigenic or teratogenic. We suggest
that the statement that ‘‘Live attenuated vaccines in any formmust
be sufficiently weakened not to cause reversion to virulence or cre-
ation of reassortments transmissible via mosquitoes” be changed
to read ‘‘Live attenuated vaccines should contain safeguards
against reversion to virulence and transmissibility through muta-
tion or reassortment”. This statement provides guidance for risk-
based regulatory assessments without unduly limiting
development.
We agree with the optimal and minimally acceptable target
that the vaccine neither cause significant adverse effects to animal
health nor compromise the food chain. We suggest adding a
requirement that LAVs be cleared rapidly and that the period of
viremia, tissue infection, shedding, and biodistribution of LAVs be
defined during vaccine development.
Efficacy: We agree with the targets regarding the percent of ani-
mals seroconverting. We suggest that the statement of protection
through colostrum apply to livestock in general, not only sheep.
With respect to Differentiating Infected from Vaccinated Animals
(DIVA), WHO recommendations should be compliant with the
Office International des Epizooties (OIE) Terrestrial Manual, which
states that ‘‘Although DIVA is an important property of any future
vaccine, a requirement for DIVA should not hinder or block the
development or licensing of an effective RVF vaccine” [47].Stability and Storage: Since some animal vaccines are currently
stored and delivered in liquid nitrogen in Africa (and elsewhere),
the Minimally Acceptable Target criteria should be changed to
allow for a liquid frozen vaccine.4.2. Human vaccine TPP
Indication for use: We suggest that ‘‘other control measures”
be defined, with an emphasis on animal vaccination to reduce
infection of humans [48].
Safety/reactogenicity. We disagree with the optimal target
description ‘‘No live-attenuated virus vaccine to be used unless
reassorting is excluded”. Reassortment cannot be categorically ‘‘ex-
cluded” for LAVs but is unlikely to have untoward consequences, as
described above. The TPP should stipulate that LAVs should contain
safeguards against reversion and reassortment and should have a
favorable benefit:risk ratio when used for RVFV prevention and
outbreak control.
We disagree with the minimally acceptable target description
‘‘Usage of an attenuated live vaccine that may allow reassortment
is not indicated in an outbreak setting.” As pointed out above, reas-
sortment cannot be categorically ‘‘excluded” for LAVs and is unli-
kely to have untoward consequences. LAVs in use and under
development already contain safeguards against reversion and
reassortment. The benefit:risk ratio (cases of RVF illness, retinitis
or death prevented per excess illness caused by a theoretical reas-
sortant) will be highly favorable for an LAV used for RVF epidemic
control. Moreover, there is no evidence for human-to-human or
human-mosquito transmission of wild-type RVFV, and this will
likely be true for both LAVs and for a LAV-wild-type reassorted
virus as well.
Efficacy: The statement ‘‘It is advised to broadly characterize
the immune response after vaccination including profiles of the
humoral and cellular immune response” could be strengthened
to advise that a biomarker of protective immunity be defined (crit-
ical to assessments of durability of protection and of efficacy in dif-
ferent populations, e.g. children, elderly). It is likely that
neutralizing antibody mediates protection, but a biomarker (anti-
body titer) has not been defined.
Product stability and storage: The minimally acceptable target
‘‘Shelf life of at least 12 months at 20 C, and demonstration of at
least 1 month stability at 2–8 C” should be expanded to allow for
frozen liquid vaccine held at < -60 C, given recent experience with
distribution of Ervebo (Ebola) vaccine during epidemics in Africa.5. Future studies on reassortment of LAVs
Once LAVs are approved and widely used to vaccinate rumi-
nants and/or humans, it is important to monitor for reassortment
and to better define the frequency of such events. Post-marketing
studies could sample animals (humans) during the first few days
after vaccination (the timing based on the period of viremia or evi-
dence for replication based on biodistribution studies of the vac-
cine), particularly when vaccinations are performed during
periods of concurrent RVFV circulation. Additional surveillance of
mosquito vectors for reassortant virus during such periods would
also be useful. Full genomic sequencing of suspect reassortant
viruses should be performed for verification. If reassortants are
found, phenotypic characterization will be important, and could
include experimental studies of virulence and host range [45].
The latter require that the virus is isolated, followed by establish-
ment of a low-passage virus stock, preferably in mosquito cells to
avoid phenotypic changes due to laboratory passage. Careful con-
sideration is needed of experimental design for virulence and host
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wild-type viruses.
6. Conclusion
LAVs have significant advantages over other vaccine designs,
including inactivated, subunit and single-cycle vectored vaccines,
since they induce rapid onset of immunity after a single dose,
and durable protection [49]. These attributes are especially impor-
tant when vaccines are used to control an ongoing epizootic in
ruminants [50] or an epidemic in humans, a critical goal for vacci-
nes against RVFV. An important factor limiting reassortment that
distinguishes RVF LAVs from other LAVs is that the wild-type
field-virus has relatively low genetic diversity, allowing vaccines
to contain only a single virus type, whereas other LAVs, exempli-
fied by bluetongue and African horsesickness, must be polyvalent
and contain mixtures of multiple viruses and serotypes to provide
adequate protection against a much wider antigenic diversity, a
feature that promotes the potential for genetic reassortment. The
safety of any new RVFV vaccine must be determined in suitably
powered trials for licensure and monitored thereafter by post-
marketing surveillance. Theoretical safety risks, such as that posed
by reassortment, can be addressed through rational vaccine design,
redundant attenuating markers, and thoughtful experimental
studies. The possibility of recombination is a basic theoretical attri-
bute of any replicating vaccine, and likewise among those with
segmented genomes reassortment is a basic attribute of replicating
vaccines; however, these theoretical risks should not be a priori
restrictions on use of vaccines otherwise shown to be safe and
effective. Rather, new vaccines should be evaluated using benefit:
risk criteria in the context of the natural disease and balance the
needs for rapid-onset and durable protection against theoretical
impacts of reassortment or recombination. The benefits of a LAV
for prevention and control of RVF outbreaks clearly outweigh the
theoretical risk of reassortment, which has not been demonstrated
to be a safety problem despite marketing widespread field-use of
two RVFV LAVs, and in preclinical studies of several others in
development.
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